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The inextricable confusion in the opinions of judges before
the war as to the extent of the power to regulate commerce has
given place to a rapid and bold extension of that power over the
whole domain of inter-State business. But the struggle between
the State power of taxation and the necessities of a national com-
mercial system does not seem to have resulted in principles of
even reasonable certainty of application. Mr. Justice Bradley a
sums up the position of the Supreme Court by saying "Inter-
State commerce cannot be taxed at all." But there is no satisfac-
tory answer in the books to the question, "What is Inter-State
commerce?" There is as yet no clear boundary line past which
what was just now a subject of inter-State commerce becomes a
subject of State commerce.
In ex parte Brown b there is an attempt to harmonize the
opinions of the Supreme Court on this subject, and to set forth a
rule which will include them all. A revenue act of North Carolina
provided that "Every merchant * * * who shall buy or sell
goods, wares and merchandise * * * shall pay a license tax of
one-tenth of one per centum on the total amount of purchases in
or out of the State-except purchases on farm products from the
producer." The court decides that the tax on goods purchased
without the State is constitutional even where such goods are in
the original package unsold in the hands of the importer. The
principle laid down in Brown v. Maryland, c that imported goods
do not become mingled with the general property of the country
until sold by the importer, is held not to apply to inter-State
transactions. The substance of Leisy v. Hardin is said to be that
"Any interference by seizure or by any other action in prohibition
of the sale of goods by their non-resident importer was a regula-
a Robbins v. Shelby Co. Taxing District, 120 U. S. 497.
b 48 Fed. Rep. 435.
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tion of inter-State commerce, but does not decide that a tax was
such an'interference," and the position established by that case
and Robbins v. Shelby Taxing .District were said to be that in the
first case "a power to sell is an adjunct of and necessarily involved
in inter-State commerce;" of the last that "a non-discriminating
tax on commodities brought into the State by non-residents is not
a tax on inter-State commerce." The result of all the decisions
and the true criterion is declared as follows: "We find that the
test of constitutionality is the absence or existence of discrimina-
tion. But the mere fact that an equal tax is laid upon the commod-
ities or business of the home and foreign state is not conclusive of
absence of discrimination. Whenever the effect of a State tax
upon a particular commodity is to protect the productions of
the taxing State from competition with such commodity, or to
evidently impose the burden of the State revenue on goods pro-
duced outside the taxing State, and to favor home productions
generally, it may be well contended that it is an interference with
inter-State commerce. Should a tax be imposed upon a commodity
for the purpose of preventing its sale at all within the State,-for
instance, should a State impose such a prohibitive tax on spirituous
liquors as should stop their sale,-the case would appear to come
within the mischief and reason of Zeisy v. Hardin, and to be uncon-
stitutional. A strong argument might be made against all State
taxation of special objects of merchandise, on the ground that the
power of taxation being in its nature unlimited, the power to tax
involved also the power to prohibit; and also for the reasons urged
by Nelson, J., in the dissenting opinion in Woodrdff v. Parham, d
that such taxation involved generally the power to discriminate in
favor of home manufactures. But no argument of that kind
applies to the case of the application for a writ of habeas corpus now
under consideration. In no manner can a general tax upon all
merchandise, which this tax in effect is, be made. discriminating.
Such taxation cannot be used to favor the manufacture of particular
articles, or of home articles in general, or to in any way check the
business of the purchase and sale of goods brought from other
States excepting in the degree that all taxation checks trade."
The court does not discuss the discrimination made in the act
between the purchaser of farm products from the producer with-
out the State and the purchaser from the wholesale merchants,
but says, "I do not regard the single exception in the statute as
material."
d 8 Mrall 123.
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There is a seeming conflict of authority between two decisions
recently rendered, one in Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Northern
Electric -Light and Power Co., 22 At. Rep. 839, and the other in
New York, Brush Electric Co. v. Wemple, Conproller, not yet
reported, the former court holding that electric light companies
are not, and the latter, that they are manufacturing companies
within the meaning of statutory provisions exempting such com-
panies from certain taxation. The reason for this difference,
however, is found in the statutes themselves which have been
enacted in the two States designating the kinds of companies
which are entitled to the exemption. In the absence of such stat-
utes, both courts agree that electric light companies should be con-
sidered as manufacturing companies in the ordinary meaning of
the term and as it is defined in lexicons and books of reference ;
the generally adopted definition including any company employ-
ing capital, skilled labor and machinery, in the production of some
article, thing or object out of raw material or material already
acted upon. Therefore, it is said, since the business of an electric
company requires the investment of capital in an expensive plant,
the consumption of coal in vast quantities,- or the concentration
of an equal amount of power by other means,- and the employ-
ment of skilled labor in the'manipulation of complicated machin-
ery, the product being distributed through a system of cables,
mains and wires ; and by the use of ingenious mechanical con-
trivances, which accumulate, measure, and liberate it at will, a
-mysterious effect is produced which is apparent in the new light;
it is evident that this is practically a manufacturing operation. It
is in every essential feature a repetition of the process described
in the definition. It is not an appropriation from nature, to be
regarded in the same light as the liberation of natural gas or oil
from the earth, or the collection and transportation of ice for cus-
tomers. Rather it is analogous to the production of illuminating
gas or artificial ice, and companies organized for either of these
purposes are manufacturing companies. Nassau Gas Lzight Co. v.
Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 409 ; People v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 99 N. Y.
ioi. Nor does it make any difference whether the product is a
material substance or a form of energy. Such a discussion would
involve not only difficult but unimportant questions. The ordi-
nary use of words of such universal application does not imply
any such refined distinction. It is sufficient that a new and useful
property, otherwise unavailable, has been discovered, and by a
wholly artificial process applied in various useful ways, to the
ordinary business of mankind.
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The case of Hermes v. Chicago & . W. Ry. Co., 5o N. W.
Rep. 584 (Wisconsin), presents an interesting question involving
the doctrine of res gestx, and which has a marked tendency to
extend its application in cases where declarations of agents are
admissible as against principals because they constitute part of
the res gest&r.
This was an action brought by the plaintiff against the defend-
ant company for the death of a child caused by the alleged negli-
gence of defendant's servants. Upon the trial below plaintiff
offered in evidence proof of certain statements made by the engi-
neer a few minutes after the accident and explanatory of its
cause, the Court admitting the evidence. Upon an appeal from
this ruling of the court, Chas. J. Cole delivering the opinion, held
the statements admissible as being part of the res gestce, interpre-
ting the doctrine to be "that the res gest&, mean the circumstances,
facts, and declarations which grow out of the main fact, are con-
temporaneous with it and serve to illustrate its character." The
effect of a tendency of decisions in this direction will be to render
it more difficult to distinguish as to what is and what is not a mere
narration of a completed act, and moreover to discern when the
mind of the person ceases to act under the impulse and as effect
of the act itself and when it has begun to act under the dictation
or direction of some independent cause or in pursuance of some
extraneous circumstance.
This case is a clear departure from the rule as laid down by
the U. S. Supreme Court in Vicksburg R. R. Co. v. O'Brien, ixg
U. S. 99, and also by the N. Y. Court of Appeals in Zuby v. Hud-
son River Railroad, 17 N. Y. 131. In the former case the court
held that the statements made by an engineer within "ten or
twenty minutes after the accident, were not part of the res gest&e
and hence not admissible." Chief Justice Harlan in the course of
his opinion, said, "such statements are not to be deemed part of
the res geste simply because of the brief period intervening between
the accident and the making of the declarations ;" continuing, he
says, "the fact remains that the occurrence had ended when the
declaration in question had been made and the engineer was not
in the act of doing anything that could possibly affect it."
The law does not always afford that degree of protection to
dogs that individuals, who own and care for valuable animals,
would desire. In a recent Mississippi case it was decided that a
dog running at large could be lawfully killed by a police officer,
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even though it was usually kept at home, had accidentally escaped,
and was being pursued by the owner's wife ; that it was entirely
within the legislative power to authorize such summary proceed-
ings, and they were free from the constitutional objection that
private property should not be taken or destroyed without due
process of law; Julienne v. City cf Jackson, zo South. Rep. 43.
In Massachusetts it has been held that a dog not licensed and col-
lared according to the provisions of law, may be shot within the
owner's close by any officer. Blair v. Forehand, oo Mass. 136.
In New Hampshire it is provided by statute that any person can
kill a dog not having a collar around its neck with the owner's
name engraved thereon, or having a collar with only the initials
of the owner's name, even if he knows the owner. See also
Marey v. Brown, 42 N. H. 373.
* *
The Supreme Court of Illinois has recently decided in the case
of Cerveny v. Chicago News Co., 28 N. E. Rep. 692, that it is libel-
lous to falsely publish of a person that he is an anarchist. The
decision is interesting inasmuch as this exact question was never
before presented to a court for consideration, and the reasoning of
the court would seem to be that such publication was libellous Per
se, for no special damages were alleged. Anarchist is defined by
Webster to be: 'An anarch ; one who incites revolt or promotes
disorder in a state." To accuse another of being an anarchist is
therefore more than charging him with being a member of a
political organization, the object of all political parties being to
maintain government, not to destroy it. To falsely publish such
a charge must as inevitably bring one into public hatred, con-
tempt and ridicule as to charge him with being a thief, though
special damage might be as hard to prove in the one case as in
the other.
* *
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in the case of Zindley v. Polk
County, 5o N. W. Rep. 975, decided that a prisoner who was con-
fined in the county jail upon an indictment for forgery, could not
recover from the county for injuries to his health caused by the
negligence of the county board of supervisors to keep the jail in
a healthy condition.
